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CASENOTES 
Expanding Federal Court Jurisdiction of 
Railway-Labor Minor Disputes: Richins v. 
Southern Pacific 
The 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act (RLA) es- 
tablished the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB).' 
The amendments gave the board jurisdiction over "minor dis- 
putes," that is, disputes arising between employees and their 
employer-railroads concerning the interpretation and applica- 
tion of provisions in collective bargaining agreemenb2 The Su- 
preme Court later interpreted the NRAB's jurisdiction to be ex- 
~lusive.~ However, in a series of cases beginning with Glover v. 
St. Louis-Sun Francisco Railway,' the Court carved out an ex- 
1. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, $ 3, 48 
Stat. 1185, 1189). 
2. The language vesting minor dispute jurisdiction in the NRAB provides: 
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or 
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of 
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including 
cases pending and unadjusted on J p e  21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual 
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated 
to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the 
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the 
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts 
and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes. 
45 U.S.C. 153(i) (1976). The term "minor dispute" is not found in the statute but is a 
term used in the railroad industry to describe the types of disputes that may be brought 
before the NRAB. 
3. In Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567 (1946), the Court held 
that federal courts should "exercise equitable discretion" and defer to the NRAB in 
cases involving minor disputes. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244-45 
(1950), made such deference mandatory for both state and federal courts. More recently, 
in Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 326 (1972), the Court overruled Moore 
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), which had allowed a discharged employee to 
pursue a wrongful discharge claim before the NRAB or sue for breach of contract in 
state court. The Court stated in Andrews: "Thus, the notion that the grievance and arbi- 
tration procedures provided for minor disputes in the Railway Labor Act are optional, to 
be availed of as, the employee or carrier chooses, was never good history and is no longer 
good law." 406 U.S. at 322. See also Walker v. Southern R.R., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966); 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957). 
4. 393 U.S. 324 (1969). 
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ception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB.' These cases 
held that if an employee alleged that his union's conduct was 
wrongful6 and that his employer was implicated in the union's 
misconduct,' federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over the 
minor dispute.' Recently, in Richins v. Southern P a c i f i ~ , ~  the 
Tenth Circuit enlarged the exception by holding that a federal 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over a minor dispute was proper 
despite the employee's failure to implicate the employer in the 
union's misconduct.1° 
Between 1972 and 1975, seven employees of Southern Pa- 
cific Company were laid off. The employees, believing the layoffs 
to be in violation of the collective bargaining agreements gov- 
erning their employment, initiated minor dispute grievance pro- 
cedures by filing claims with the union. Following standard pro- 
cedures for resolving minor disputes, both the railroad and the 
union conducted independent investigations of the claims. Both 
determined the claims to be without merit; consequently, the 
union did not refer the claims to the NRAB.ll The employees, 
5. In addition to Glover, Czo~ek v. O'Mara, 379 U.S. 25 (1970), and Conley v. Gib- 
son, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)' create exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB. 
6. The union's wrongful conduct in Glover consisted of a racially discriminatory ap- 
plication of the collective bargaining agreement. C o e  have not limited the requisite 
wrongdoing to racial discrimination but have extended it to conduct constituting a 
breach of the union's duty of fair representation. See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair 
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tim. L. REV. 1119 (1973). 
7. The exception in Glover actually took the form of an exception to the "exhaus- 
tion of remedies" rule. The exception applies when resort to the administrative body 
would be futile because of union-railroad collusion. 393 U.S. at  329-31. Czosek v. O'Mara, 
397 U.S. 25 (1970), extended Glover beyond collusion ,to situations in which the employer 
is implicated in the union's misconduct. 
8. The statutory bases for jurisdicton of cases arising under the RLA are 28 U.S.C. 
5 1331 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. g 1337 (1976). 
9. 620 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1980)' cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1981). 
10. Neither the complaint nor the appellate brief contained allegations implicating 
the railroad in the union's misconduct. 
In addition to extending Glover, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Richins is in conflict 
with decisions in other circuits. In Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp., 571 F.2d 747 (3d 
Cir. 1978)' the Third Circuit held that the NRAB had exclusive jurisdiction over a minor 
dispute regardless of the intertwining of a fair representation claim (based on a union's 
wrongful conduct) with the minor dispute. See also Price v. Southern Pac. Transp., 586 
F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). 
There is some authority in the circuits that inferentially extends Glover to the fac- 
tual context of Richins. See, e.g., Bagnall v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 626 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 
1980); Schum v. South B. Ry., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Trans World Air- 
lines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). 
11. Brief for Appellee Union a t  19-20, Richins v. Southern Pac., 620 F.2d 761 (10th 
Cir. 1980). 
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instead of taking the claims to the NRAB themselves as pro- 
vided in the statute,12 sought adjudication in federal court by 
bringing an action against the railroad and the union." The em- 
ployees alleged that the railroad had breached the collective bar- 
gaining agreements and that the union, by failing to process 
their grievances before the NRAB, had breached its duty of fair 
The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdic- 
tion? It held that the claim for breach of the collective bargain- 
ing agreements, being a minor dispute, was within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the NRAB.16 The court further held that the fair 
representation claim was subject to the "exhaustion of reme- 
dies" rule, requiring the plaintiffs to proceed before the NRAB 
before resorting to federal court.'' 
The Tenth Circuit reversed. The fair representation claim, 
the court said, could be brought in federal court because it was 
neither subject to the NRAB jurisdiction nor to the "exhaustion 
of remedies" rule.lS The court held that because the fair repre- 
sentation claim was intertwined with the minor dispute, a fed- 
eral court could exercise jurisdiction over the entire action? 
12. 45 U.S.C. 5 153(j) (1976). This section provides that an aggrieved employee may 
represent himself before the NRAB or designate some other representative. Because of 
the partisan nature of the Board, see notes 21-25 and accompanying text infra, the em- 
ployee usually elects to have his union represent his interests before the NRAB. 
13. The employees sought reinstatement with full seniority, lost wages and benefits, 
and punitive damages. 620 F.2d at  761. 
14. Id. 
15. Richins v. Southern Pac., No. 77-0038 (D. Utah Sept. 6, 1978), rev'd, 620 F.2d 
761 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1981). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. Courts have often based their refusal to adjudicate minor disputes on the 
"exhaustion of remedies" doctrine. In Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 
(1972), the Court questioned the accuracy of the term "exhaustion of remedies" for 
describing the required submission of minor disputes to the NRAB. 
The term "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in its broader sense 
may be an entirely appropriate description of the obligation of both the em- 
ployee and carrier under the Railway Labor Act to resort to dispute settlement 
procedures provided by that Act. I t  is clear, however, that in at  least some 
situations the Act makes the federal administrative remedy exclusive, rather 
than merely requiring exhaustion of remedies in one forum before resorting to 
another. 
Id. at  325. By stating that in some situations the NRAB remedy is exclusive, the Court 
in Andrews implied that in other contexts it is not. The factual situation in Glover is 
among those not subject to the exclusive jurisdicton of the NRAB. 
18. 620 F.2d at  762 (relying on and quoting Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27-28 
(1970)). 
19. Id. at  763. 
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The Richins opinion is unsound not because it expands fed- 
eral court jurisdiction over minor disputes, but because the ex- 
pansion is too broad. The propriety of expanding federal court 
jurisdiction over minor disputes can be determined by balancing 
two competing interests: providing claimants access to an impar- 
tial forum and preserving the RLA's minor dispute resolution 
process. Richins, by allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdic- 
tion over any minor dispute to which the union is opposed, ig- 
nores the second of these interests and seriously undermines the 
NRAB grievance process. 
The Glover holding reflects a sensitivity to the first of the 
competing concerns-providing claimants an impartial forum. 
The Court in Glover recognized the futility of requiring an indi- 
vidual to submit his grievance to the NRAB when both the rail- 
road and the union oppose the claim. Therefore, the Court 
granted the claimants immediate access to the federal courts be- 
cause of the union-railroad compli~ity.'~ By requiring the claim- 
ant to implicate the employer in the union's misconduct, the 
Glover holding protects the individual claimant from union-rail- 
road collusion. However, even where such collusion does not ex- 
ist, an individual has little chance for a fair hearing before the 
NRAB if the union opposes his claim." Thirty-four individuals 
comprise the NRAB-seventeen chosen by railroads and seven- 
teen chosen by unions." An appointment to serve on the NRAB 
is of indefinite duration; consequently, a member serves at the 
pleasure of his pr in~ipal .~~ The NRAB's performance illustrates 
20. 393 U.S. at  330. 
21. Less than one percent of the claims submitted by individual claimants have 
been sustained, whereas twenty-eight percent of the claims submitted by the union have 
been sustained. Lazar, "Individwl" and "Outside Union" Grievances Before the Na- 
tional Railroad Adjustment Board Firat Diuiaion, 15 LAB. L.J. 231, 233-34 (1964). 
22. 45 U.S.C. 153(a) (1976). 
23. The following excerpt illustrates why representatives invariably serve their prin- 
cipal's interests: 
In all except a very few cases, labor and carrier members vote as a block. Fail- 
ure to do so has marked the end of the career of one labor member. He repre- 
sented the Order of Railroad Telegraphers and was sitting on a group of cases 
which, if decided for the employees, would have the effect of resolving a juris- 
dictional strike between his union and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks in 
favor of the latter. After considerable controversy, the Telegrapher representa- 
tive voted with the carrier members to deny the claim. Whereupon, the presi- 
dent of the Railway Clerks called a special meeting of the Railway Labor Exec- 
utives Association, which removed the Telegrapher representative from the 
Third Division and substituted one from the Hotel and Restaurant Workers. 
Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical Analysis, 5 INDUS. & LAB. 
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that members "vote their constituency" without regard to the 
merits of a claim.24 These factors demonstrate the inadequacy of 
the NRAB remedy for the claimant whose union opposes his 
claim and urge the expansion of Glover to allow federal courts to 
adjudicate disputes even when collusion is not present? 
Nevertheless, in expanding federal court jurisdiction over 
minor disputes, the second of the competing interests must be 
accommodated-that of preserving the NRAB grievance process. 
The Supreme Court, in Union Pacific Railroad v. Sheehan,'@ ar- 
ticulated the congressional policy toward minor dispute resolu- 
tion by stating: "Congress considered it essential to keep these 
so-called 'minor' disputes within the Adjustment Board and out 
of the  court^."^^ Several considerations support this policy. First, 
the NRAB is peculiarly qualified to interpret and apply railroad 
bargaining agreements. 
It should be recognized that the parties to collective bargaining 
contracts sometimes express themselves obscurely or with un- 
due brevity. Words and expressions have special meanings in 
the railroad industry. Contract history and past practice often 
give meanings to language, which the uninitiated do not know. 
The NRAB is an expert body having knowledge and apprecia- 
tion of these aspects of agreements in the railroad industry.28 
Secondly, the NRAB grievance procedures have produced a con- 
siderable period of industrial peace in the railroad sector.29 
REL. REV. 365, 381-82 (1952). 
24. During the ten-year period from 1967 to 1977, 94.4% of all claims presented to 
the NRAB were deadlocked along railroad-labor lines. (Data compiled from National 
Mediation Board Ann. Rpta. 1967-77.) The partisan attitude of the NRAB was revealed 
in an incident arising out of a labor representative's assertion that railroad representa- 
tives were partisan in favor of their principals. The railway representative replied that he 
and other railroad representatives viewed their role as judges rather than advocates. 
"Within a year or two thereafter the entire [railroad] membership on the First Division 
was replaced, giving rise to the inference that the [railroads] preferred [their] represent- 
atives to be partisans rather than judges." Seidenberg, Grievance Adjustment in the 
Railroad Industry, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY 218 (C. Rehmus ed. 1977). 
25. For a detailed discusaon of the problems faced by an individual who is not rep- 
resented by his union, see Lazar, supra note 21. 
26. 439 U.S. 89 (1978). 
27. Id. at 94. 
28. Larson, Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act, in LABOR LAW DE- 
VBLOPM~NTS (Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Institute on Labor Law, 1964). See 
also Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative 
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567, 568-69 (1937); Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Ma- 
chinery: A Critical Analysis-11, 5 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 540, 549 (1952). 
29. Seidenberg, supra note 24, at  235. 
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These considerations underscore the need to preserve the integ- 
rity of the NRAB grievance procedure. 
Richins does not adequately preserve the grievance proce- 
dure. In order for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over mi- 
nor disputes, Richins would merely require (1) that the fair rep- 
resentation and minor dispute claims arise from the same series 
of events, and (2) that the factual allegations be consistent with 
a pattern of collusion between the railroad and the union.'O 
These requirements pose no appreciable jurisdictional barrier to 
the plaintiff whose union will not press his claim to the NRAB. 
The first requirement is easily met because the two claims invar- 
iably arise from the same series of events," and the second re- 
quirement is meaningless because almost any fact situation will 
support a reading of ~ollusion.~ Under Richins, then, virtually 
whenever a union refuses to forward a claim to the NRAB, the 
employee could resort to federal court. 
The lack of an adequate bar to federal court adjudication of 
minor disputes imperils the NRAB grievance procedure. Unions, 
recognizing that it is more costly to contest a fair representation 
claim in court than to process a grievance before the NRAB, 
might be induced to process all claims regardless of merit? The 
resulting flood of cases could overwhelm the NRAB, recreate the 
backlog that existed before the 1966 amendments,M and possibly 
destroy the Board altogether. 
30. 620 F.2d at 762-63. The court does not explicitly create a jurisdictional test. The 
requirements listed textually are inferred from the opinion. In addition to the two re- 
quirements listed in the text, the court might require that bifurcation be difficult, id. at 
762, and that the plaintiff allege the union's conduct to be "maliciously discriminatory," 
id. at 763. 
31. The second claim (breach of duty of fair representation) arises from the union's 
refusal to forward the first claim (breach of collective bargaining agreement) to the 
NRAB. 
32. The language of the opinion requires only that the alleged facts not preclude a 
reading of collusion. 620 F.2d at 762. Because the factual context of Richins necessarily 
requires the union and the railroad to reach the same conclusion-not to forward the 
grievance to the NRAI.3-it is doubtful that any set of allegations would preclude a read- 
ing of collusion. 
33. Richins does not increase the union's amenability to federal court jurisdiction; a 
fair representation claim is always subject to federal court jurisdiction. However, the 
number of fair representation claims against the union may increase when the aggrieved 
employees, whose unions will not refer their minor dispute claims to the NRAB, realize' 
that the minor dispute can be adjudicated in federal court if the union is joined for 
breaching its duty of fair representation. 
34. Prior to the 1966 amendments, the First Division of the NRAB had a backlog of 
seven and one-half years. Risher, The Railway Labor Act, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
51, 80 (1970). 
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To strike a proper balance between assuring an impartial 
forum to claimants and protecting the NRAB grievance process, 
the standard for determining when minor disputes may be 
brought in federal court should fall somewhere between the 
Glover testa6 and the Richins test? Before exercising jurisdic- 
tion over a minor dispute, a court should require the plaintiff to 
show that the NRAB remedy is inadequate because (1) the 
union refused to represent the employee's interests before the 
NRAB," and (2) such refusal was arbitrary or motivated by hos- 
tility. If the plaintiff fails to make the required showing, the mi- 
nor dispute should be adjudicated by the NRAB? 
The plaintiffs characterization of the union's refusal to re- 
present his interests would determine how the court should test 
his allegations. If the refusal is alleged to be arbitrary, then the 
court should adjudicate the minor dispute only if the plaintiffs 
showing that the NRAB remedy is inadequate can survive a mo- 
tion for summary judgment. Under this test, the party moving 
for summary judgment (the railroad) would set forth evidence 
showing a rational, legitimate reason for the union's conduct. To 
survive the motion, the responding party (the employee) would 
have to raise an inference that the reason was not rational or not 
legitimate. However, when hostility is the alleged basis for the 
refusal, the summary judgment threshold does not adequately 
protect the NRAB jurisdiction. A showing of hostility requires 
an inquiry into the "state of mind" of union officials. Because 
courts are reluctant to grant summary judgment when someone's 
"state of mind" is at issue?'' the court should not adjudicate a 
35. This test requires the plaintiff to allege (1) that the union breached its duty of 
fair representation, and (2) that the employer is implicated in the breach. 393 U.S. 324 
(1969). 
36. This test requires (1) that the alleged facts not preclude a reading of collusion, 
and (2) that the fair representation and minor dispute claims arise from the same series 
of events. 620 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1980). 
37. This standard can be adapted to include situations in which the union, though 
not unwilling to refer the minor dispute to the NRAB, is unable to adequately represent 
the claimant's interests before the Board. (E.g., the union's interests are adverse to those 
of the claimant.) In this context, the plaintiff would be required to show (1) that the 
union is unable to adequately represent the claimant's interests, and (2) that hostility is 
the cause of the inability. The two requirements are jurisdictional facts, thus requiring 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence before a federal court could adjudicate the 
minor dispute. 
38. Plaintiffs showing is similar to the elements of a fair representation claim. See 
generally Clark, supra note 6. 
39. "As a general proposition, summary judgment is likely to be inappropriate when 
issues of motive, intent, and other subjective feelings and reactions are material." 6 
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minor dispute when hostility is alleged to have motivated the 
refusal unless the plaintiff first wins the fair representation 
claim on the merits.'O 
The jurisdictional threshold set forth above protects the 
NRAB grievance scheme by allowing federal court jurisdiction 
over minor disputes only if the plaintiff can show that the 
NRAB remedy is inadequate because of union misconduct. By 
permitting access to federal court without a showing of union- 
railroad collusion, the threshold is more responsive to the need 
for an impartial forum than the Glover rule." 
Richard H. Page 
MOORE'S Federal Practice 1 56.17, at  930 (2d ed. 1976). In the fair representation con- 
text, several courta have denied motions for summary judgment when the inference of 
wrongdoing was weak. See, e.g., Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 
1978); Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1974). 
40. A finding that the union breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to 
represent an employee's interest before the NRAB removes the jurisdictional barrier 
preventing federal courta from adjudicating the minor dispute. Conduct constituting 
such a breach should be limited to arbitrary or hostile conduct-conduct identical to 
that required in the plaintiif's showing that the NRAB remedy is inadequate. Some com- 
mentators assert that procedural negligence by a union also constitutes a breach of the 
union's duty of fair representation. See Morgan, Fair is Foul, and Foul is Fair-Ruzicka 
and the Duty of Fair Representaton in the Circuit Courts, 11 TOL. L. REV. 335 (1980). 
However, a breach based on procedural negligence should not satisfy the jurisdictional 
threshold set forth in the text. Forcing a railroad to adjudicate a minor dispute in federal 
court because of a union's negligence could cause the railroad to waive a statute of limi- 
tations or similar defense that may have arisen due to union negligence in filing the 
appeal. Requiring the railroad to adjudicate a minor dispute in federal court if the 
union's breach is founded on arbitrary or hostile conduct does not involve such a waiver, 
but only a change in tribunals. 
41. Although access to federal court is greater under this proposed test than under 
Glover, it does not provide access to federal court whenever the NRAB remedy is inade- 
quate due to the NRAB's institutional bias. A claimant could have a valid grievance 
against the railroad, but because the union's refusal was not arbitrary or hostile (e.g., the 
union interests are legitimate but adverse to those of the claimant), the grievance must 
be taken to the NRAB for adjudication. Because the Board proceedings are partisan and 
because review of Board decisions is very narrow, such a claimaint is left without a 
remedy. 
